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Marco Serena, Ph.D.

Wissenschaftlicher Referent

Telefon: +49-89-24246-5259
Fax: +49-89-24246-5299
E-Mail: marco.serena@tax.mpg.de

Raum: M8.606

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Arbeitsbereiche:

Mikroökonomie, Wettbewerb, politische Ökonomie, Informationen

 

Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang:

2016 – heute: Wissenschaftlicher Referent am Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen

2012 – 2017: Promotionsstudium in Economics (summa cum laude), Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien

2010 – 2012: M.A. in Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien

2007 – 2009: M.A. in Economics (summa cum laude), Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien

2004 – 2007: B.A. in Economics, Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien

 

Persönliche Webseite:

https://sites.google.com/site/marcoserenaphd/

Internationale Zeitschriften mit Gutachterverfahren:

Mavridis, C.  und  Serena, M. , 2018.  Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size.  Public Choice , S.  53 -66 . 

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Serena, M. , 2017.  Sequential contests revisited.  Public Choice , 173(1-2), S.  131 -144 . 
Serena, M. , 2017.  Quality contests.  European Journal of Political Economy , 46, S.  15 -25 . 

Diskussionspapiere:

Barbieri, S.  und  Serena, M. , Winners' efforts in team contests.  Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2019-03. 

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Serena, M. , A Level-k theory for private information games.  Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-12. 

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Serena, M. , Harnessing beliefs to stimulate efforts.  Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-11. 

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Serena, M.  und  Corchón, L. , Properties of contests.  Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-10. 

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Serena, M. , Level-k models rationalize overspending in contests.  Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-09. 

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Serena, M. , Biasing unbiased dynamic contests.  Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-06. 

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Serena, M. , Successful opaque management.  Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-01. 

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Serena, M.  und  Mavridis, C. , Costly voting under complete information. 

Wissenschaftliche Aufsätze in Sammelbänden:

Serena, M.  und  Corchón, L. , 2018.  Contests Theory: a survey.  In:  Corchón, L.  und  Marini, M. A.  (Hrsg.) , Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization.  Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA,  Edward Elgar.