FISCAL & SOCIAL STATE
Referent: Marcin Dziubinski
Marcin Dziubinski will present his paper titled "Simple security games".
Abstract of the paper:
We study a class of simple security games, a type of conflict with multiple battlefields and asymmetric players: a defender and an attacker, where the defender always wins a conflict with the attacker. The model allows for heterogeneous values of battlefields, also across the players, and multiple resources of the players. We characterize Nash equilibria and the value of such games in terms of marginal distributions and propose an algorithm for computing small support mixed strategies for given marginals. The characterization allows us to establish a number of interesting qualitative features of equilibria. This is joint work with Jaideep Roy.
Chair: Kai A. Konrad, Co-Chair: Subhasish Chowdhury
Event Team
Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
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FISCAL & SOCIAL STATE