FISCAL & SOCIAL STATE
Referent: Felix Várdy
Date & Time: Cincinnati (10 am), Los Angeles (7 am), Bath (3 pm), Munich (4 pm), Singapore (11 pm), Beijing (11 pm), Sydney (January 20, 2 am)
Felix Várdy will present his paper titled "The Limits of Meritocracy" (joint work with John Morgan, and Justin Tumlinson).
Abstract of the Paper:
We show that meritocracy, in the sense of accuracy of performance ranking, can be too much of a good thing: in contests with sufficiently homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity.
Chair: Qiang Fu, Co-Chair: Tracy Liu and Lionel Page
Event Team
Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
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FISCAL & SOCIAL STATE