Date & Time: Los Angeles (6 am), Cincinnati (9 am), Bath (2 pm), Munich (3 pm), Beijing (10 pm), Singapore (10 pm), Sydney (December 22, 1 am)

Igor Letina will present the paper titled "Market-Bound Research Contests".

This talk is part of the Global Seminar on Contests & Conflict, a bi-weekly online seminar series with researchers from across the world. You can sign up to the Global Network to get information and invitations (including the Zoom Link for each event) about the Global Seminar here: Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen: Global Seminar on Contests & Conflict (mpg.de).

Abstract of the Paper:
In many instances the social value of an innovation is much larger than the profits that a firm can obtain by selling the innovation on the market. When this is the case, a research contest can help align incentives and increase welfare. This paper examines the optimal design of research contests when the objective of the principal is discovery and broad adoption of socially valuable innovations. We show that the principal benefits from conditioning the size of the prize on the market performance of the winner. The optimal contest features two quantity cutoffs and two prize levels. The low prize is awarded if the winner sells a quantity greater than the first cutoff while the high prize is awarded if the winner sells a a quantity greater than the second cutoff.

Chair: Qiang Fu, Co-Chair: Tracy Liu and Lionel Page