Date & Time: Los Angeles (8 am), Cincinnati (11 am), Bath (4 pm), Munich (5 pm), Beijing (11 pm), Singapore (11 pm), Sydney (September 21, 1 am)

Anastasia Antsygina will present the paper titled "Support Networks in Contests" (joint work with Mariya Teteryatnikova).

This talk is part of the Global Seminar on Contests & Conflict, an online seminar series with researchers from across the world. You can sign up to the Global Network to get information and invitations (including the Zoom Link for each event) about the Global Seminar here: Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen: Global Seminar on Contests & Conflict (mpg.de).

You can directly access the event here:

Zoom

(Meeting ID: 670 2007 2636, Passcode: 200511)

Abstract of the Paper:
We study how three heterogenous agents form a support network in the face of bilateral conflict. With a positive probability, each agent engages in a contest game, which we model as an all-pay auction with complete information, against one of his peers. Before the contest, the agents can create a network to support each other. Forming a link is costly but results in direct (effort cost reduction) and indirect (joy of winning) benefits. We show that a pairwise stable network always exists, and complete network is never in this set. The exact number of links being formed depends on the size of indirect benefits. In particular, a network with two links is pairwise stable if and only if indirect benefits are large enough. Finally, a pairwise stable  network is generally inefficient and can display either underinvest or overinvest in the links. 

Chair: Subhasish Chowdhury, Co-Chair: Kai A. Konrad