Date & Time: Bath (5 pm), Munich (6 pm), Cincinnati (12 pm), Los Angeles (9 am), Singapore (July 1, 12 am), Beijing (July 1, 12 am), Sydney (July 1, 2 am)

Iryna Topolyan will present her paper titled "Correlated Play in Group Contests" (joint work with Stefano Barbieri).

Abstract of the paper: 
We apply public randomization (Harriset et al., 1995) in group contests settings and introduce group public randomization equilibria (GPRE). We consider group all-pay auctions with various aggregation technologies, including best shot, weakest link, and CES aggregator rules. The well-known multiplicity of equilibria in group contests becomes even more pronounced in weakest link contests with public randomization. However, a refinement of GPRE in the spirit of coalition proofness reduces the gamut of GPRE to a unique strategy profile. Introducing public randomization enables us to analyze group all-pay auctions with a CES aggregator rule, for the first time in the literature. Remarkably, the equilibrium strategy is independent of the elasticity of effort substitution.

Chair: Subhasish Chowdhury, Co-Chair: Kai A. Konrad