English
Marco Serena, Ph.D.Wissenschaftlicher Referent
Telefon:+49-89-24246-5259
Fax:+49-89-24246-5299
E-Mail: marco.serena@tax.mpg.de
Raum:M8.606
Persönliche Webseite (mit aktualisierten Papers):
https://sites.google.com/site/marcoserenaphd/
Arbeitsbereiche:
Mikroökonomie, Wettbewerb, politische Ökonomie, Informationen
Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang:
2016 – heute: Wissenschaftlicher Referent am Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
2012 – 2017: Promotionsstudium in Economics (summa cum laude), Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien
2010 – 2012: M.A. in Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien
2007 – 2009: M.A. in Economics (summa cum laude), Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien
2004 – 2007: B.A. in Economics, Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien
Internationale Zeitschriften mit Gutachterverfahren:
Barbieri, S. und Serena, M., Winner’s effort maximization in large contests. Journal of Mathematical Economics, im Erscheinen.
Serena, M., Harnessing Beliefs to Optimally Disclose Contestants' Types. Economic Theory, im Erscheinen.
Mavridis, C. und Serena, M., 2021. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits. European Journal of Political Economy, 67(4).
Serena, M., 2021. The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management. International Journal of Game Theory, S. 1-21.
Serena, M., 2019. A game-free microfoundation of mutual optimism. Games, 10(4), S. 37-50.
Mavridis, C. und Serena, M., 2018. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice, S. 53-66.
Serena, M., 2017. Sequential contests revisited. Public Choice, 173(1-2), S. 131-144.
Serena, M., 2017. Quality contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 46, S. 15-25.
Diskussionspapiere:
Barbieri, S. und Serena, M., Reputation for toughness. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2021-16.
Chen, B. und Serena, M., Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-08.
Send, J. und Serena, M., An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance 2021-05.
Barbieri, S. und Serena, M., Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-07.
Barbieri, S. und Serena, M., Winners' efforts in team contests. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2019-03.
Serena, M., A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-12.
Serena, M., Biasing Dynamic Contests Between Ex-Ante Symmetric Players. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-06.
Serena, M. und Arve, M., Level-k models rationalize overspending in contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-09.
Serena, M. und Corchón, L., Properties of contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-10.
Wissenschaftliche Aufsätze in Sammelbänden:
Serena, M. und Corchón, L., 2018. Contests Theory: a survey. In: Corchón, L. und Marini, M. A. (Hrsg.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization. Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar.