Marco Serena, Ph.D.
Wissenschaftlicher Referent
Telefon:
+49-89-24246-5259
Fax: +49-89-24246-5299
E-Mail:
marco.serena@tax.mpg.de
Raum: M8.606
Arbeitsbereiche:
Mikroökonomie, Wettbewerb, politische Ökonomie, Informationen
Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang:
2016 – heute: Wissenschaftlicher Referent am Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
2012 – 2017: Promotionsstudium in Economics (summa cum laude), Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien
2010 – 2012: M.A. in Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien
2007 – 2009: M.A. in Economics (summa cum laude), Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien
2004 – 2007: B.A. in Economics, Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien
Persönliche Webseite:
https://sites.google.com/site/marcoserenaphd/
Internationale Zeitschriften mit Gutachterverfahren:
Mavridis, C.
und
Serena, M.
,
Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and Asymmetric Benefits.
European Journal of Political Economy
, im Erscheinen.
SSRN
Serena, M.
,
The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management.
International Journal of Game Theory
, im Erscheinen.
SSRN
Serena, M.
, 2019.
A game-free microfoundation of mutual optimism.
Games
, 10(4),
S.
37
-50
.
DOI: 10.3390/g10040037
Mavridis, C.
und
Serena, M.
, 2018.
Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size.
Public Choice
,
S.
53
-66
.
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6
Serena, M.
, 2017.
Sequential contests revisited.
Public Choice
, 173(1-2),
S.
131
-144
.
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0467-3
Serena, M.
, 2017.
Quality contests.
European Journal of Political Economy
, 46,
S.
15
-25
.
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008
Diskussionspapiere:
Barbieri, S.
und
Serena, M.
, Winner’s Effort Maximization in Large Contests.
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-13.
SSRN
Chen, B.
und
Serena, M.
, Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies.
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020 - 08.
SSRN
Barbieri, S.
und
Serena, M.
, Momentum and Heterogeneity in Contests.
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-07.
SSRN
Barbieri, S.
und
Serena, M.
, Winners' efforts in team contests.
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2019-03.
SSRN
Serena, M.
, A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games.
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-12.
SSRN
Serena, M.
, Biasing Dynamic Contests Between Ex-Ante Symmetric Players.
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-06.
SSRN
Serena, M.
und
Arve, M.
, Level-k models rationalize overspending in contests.
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-09.
SSRN
Serena, M.
und
Corchón, L.
, Properties of contests.
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-10.
SSRN
Serena, M.
, Harnessing Beliefs to Optimally Disclose Contestants' Types.
Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-11.
SSRN
Wissenschaftliche Aufsätze in Sammelbänden:
Serena, M.
und
Corchón, L.
, 2018.
Contests Theory: a survey.
In:
Corchón, L.
und
Marini, M. A.
(Hrsg.)
, Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization.
Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA,
Edward Elgar.