Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen

Marco Serena, Ph.D.

Wissenschaftlicher Referent

Telefon: +49-89-24246-5259
Fax: +49-89-24246-5299
E-Mail: marco.serena@tax.mpg.de

Raum: M8.606

Nachricht für

Arbeitsbereiche:

Mikroökonomie, Wettbewerb, politische Ökonomie, Informationen

Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang:

2016 – heute: Wissenschaftlicher Referent am Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen

2012 – 2017: Promotionsstudium in Economics (summa cum laude), Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien

2010 – 2012: M.A. in Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien

2007 – 2009: M.A. in Economics (summa cum laude), Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien

2004 – 2007: B.A. in Economics, Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien

Persönliche Webseite:

https://sites.google.com/site/marcoserenaphd/

Internationale Zeitschriften mit Gutachterverfahren:

Mavridis, C. und Serena, M. , Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and Asymmetric Beneﬁts. European Journal of Political Economy , im Erscheinen.

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Serena, M. , The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management. International Journal of Game Theory , im Erscheinen.

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Serena, M. , 2019. A game-free microfoundation of mutual optimism. Games , 10(4), S. 37 -50 .

DOI: 10.3390/g10040037

Mavridis, C. und Serena, M. , 2018. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice , S. 53 -66 .

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6

Serena, M. , 2017. Sequential contests revisited. Public Choice , 173(1-2), S. 131 -144 .

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0467-3

Serena, M. , 2017. Quality contests. European Journal of Political Economy , 46, S. 15 -25 .

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008

Diskussionspapiere:

Barbieri, S. und Serena, M. , Winner’s Effort Maximization in Large Contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-13.

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Chen, B. und Serena, M. , Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020 - 08.

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Barbieri, S. und Serena, M. , Momentum and Heterogeneity in Contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-07.

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Barbieri, S. und Serena, M. , Winners' efforts in team contests. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2019-03.

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Serena, M. , A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-12.

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Serena, M. , Biasing Dynamic Contests Between Ex-Ante Symmetric Players. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-06.

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Serena, M. und Arve, M. , Level-k models rationalize overspending in contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-09.

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Serena, M. und Corchón, L. , Properties of contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-10.

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Serena, M. , Harnessing Beliefs to Optimally Disclose Contestants' Types. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-11.

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Wissenschaftliche Aufsätze in Sammelbänden:

Serena, M. und Corchón, L. , 2018. Contests Theory: a survey. In: Corchón, L. und Marini, M. A. (Hrsg.) , Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization. Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar.