Marco Serena, Ph.D.
Senior Research Fellow
Phone:+49-89-24246-5259
Fax:+49-89-24246-5299
Mail: marco.serena@tax.mpg.de
Room:M8.606
Academic Résumé
- 2016 – present: Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
- 2012 – 2017: Ph.D. candidate in Economics (summa cum laude), Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spain
- 2010 – 2012: M.A. in Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spain
- 2007 – 2009: M.A. in Economics (summa cum laude), Bocconi University, Milano, Italy
- 2004 – 2007: B.A. in Economics, Bocconi University, Milano, Italy
Peer Reviewed International Journals:
Send, J. and Serena, M., An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining. Journal of Economic Psychology, forthcoming.
Serena, M., 2021. Harnessing Beliefs to Optimally Disclose Contestants' Types. Economic Theory.
Barbieri, S. and Serena, M., 2021. Winner’s effort maximization in large contests. Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Mavridis, C. and Serena, M., 2021. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits. European Journal of Political Economy, 67(4).
Serena, M., 2021. The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management. International Journal of Game Theory, pp. 1-21.
Serena, M., 2021. Properties of contests: Constructing contest success functions from best-responses. Journal of Dynamics and Games.
Serena, M., 2019. A game-free microfoundation of mutual optimism. Games, 10(4), pp. 37-50.
Mavridis, C. and Serena, M., 2018. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice, pp. 53-66.
Serena, M., 2017. Sequential contests revisited. Public Choice, 173(1-2), pp. 131-144.
Serena, M., 2017. Quality contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 46, pp. 15-25.
Working papers:
Barbieri, S. and Serena, M., Reputation for toughness. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2021-16.
Chen, B. and Serena, M., Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-08.
Barbieri, S. and Serena, M., Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-07.
Barbieri, S. and Serena, M., Winners' efforts in team contests. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2019-03.
Serena, M., A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-12.
Serena, M., Biasing Dynamic Contests Between Ex-Ante Symmetric Players. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-06.
Serena, M. and Arve, M., Level-k models rationalize overspending in contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-09.