Marco Serena, Ph.D.Senior Research Fellow

Phone:+49-89-24246-5259
Fax:+49-89-24246-5299
Mail: marco.serena@tax.mpg.de

Room:M8.606

Personal Website (with updated papers):

https://sites.google.com/site/marcoserenaphd/

 

Areas of Interest:

Microeconomic Theory, Contests, Political Economy, Information

 

Academic Résumé:

2016 – present: Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

2012 – 2017: Ph.D. candidate in Economics (summa cum laude), Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spain

2010 – 2012: M.A. in Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spain

2007 – 2009: M.A. in Economics (summa cum laude), Bocconi University, Milano, Italy

2004 – 2007: B.A. in Economics, Bocconi University, Milano, Italy

Peer Reviewed International Journals:

Barbieri, S. and Serena, M.Winner’s effort maximization in large contests. Journal of Mathematical Economics, forthcoming. 

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102512

Mavridis, C. and Serena, M., 2021. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits. European Journal of Political Economy, 67(4)

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101961

Serena, M., 2021. The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management. International Journal of Game Theory, pp. 1-21

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00750-0

Serena, M., 2019. A game-free microfoundation of mutual optimism. Games, 10(4), pp. 37-50

DOI: 10.3390/g10040037

Mavridis, C. and Serena, M., 2018. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice, pp. 53-66

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6

Serena, M., 2017. Sequential contests revisited. Public Choice, 173(1-2), pp. 131-144

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0467-3

Serena, M., 2017. Quality contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 46, pp. 15-25

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008

Working papers:

Send, J. and Serena, M., An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance. 

SSRN

Chen, B. and Serena, M., Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020 - 08. 

SSRN

Barbieri, S. and Serena, M., Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-07. 

SSRN

Barbieri, S. and Serena, M., Winners' efforts in team contests. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2019-03. 

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Serena, M., A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-12. 

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Serena, M., Biasing Dynamic Contests Between Ex-Ante Symmetric Players. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-06. 

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Serena, M. and Arve, M., Level-k models rationalize overspending in contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-09. 

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Serena, M. and Corchón, L., Properties of contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-10. 

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Serena, M., Harnessing Beliefs to Optimally Disclose Contestants' Types. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-11. 

SSRN

Academic Papers in Collected Volumes:

Serena, M. and Corchón, L., 2018. Contests Theory: a survey. In: Corchón, L. and Marini, M. A. (eds.)Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial OrganizationCheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar.