LISA WINDSTEIGER

CONTACT INFORMATION

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GENDER: Female   **CITIZENSHIP**: Austrian

CURRENT POSITION

Senior Research Fellow (Post Doc) at the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Munich

EDUCATION

2013 – 2017 PhD Economics, London School of Economics
2011 – 2013 MRes Economics (Distinction), London School of Economics
2009 – 2011 MSc Economics (Distinction), Vienna Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
2003 – 2009 Dipl.-Ing (equiv. MSc) Mathematics (Distinction), Vienna University of Technology

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

Microeconomics, Political Economy, Public Economics, Behavioural Economics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

2014 – 2017:   EC440 Micro and Macro Economics (for Public Policy), LSE (Graduate)
2014 – 2016:   EC453 Political Economy, LSE (Graduate)
2014 and 2015: EC400 Introductory Course in Mathematics and Statistics, LSE (Graduate)
2012 – 2013:   EC201 Microeconomic Principles, LSE (Undergraduate)
2010 – 2011:   Mathematics 1 and Macroeconomics 2, Vienna Institute for Advanced Studies (Graduate)

RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:

2014 - present: Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, LSE
October 2015:   Research Assistant, Dr. Ethan Ilzetzki, LSE
2013 – 2014:   Research Assistant, Lord Adair Turner
2012 – 2013:   Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, LSE

LANGUAGES

German (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate), Spanish (basic)

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

- LSE Teaching Fellowship 2014-2017
- LSE PhD Scholarship 2011-2013
- Austrian Lottery Award 2010, Austrian Lotteries and Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna
- Franz Weninger Award 2009, Austrian National Bank for the Master's Thesis "The Monetary Policy Strategy of the ECB and the Role of Money"

WORKING PAPERS

"The Redistributive Consequences of Segregation"

Abstract: In this paper I present a model in which people sort into groups according to income and as a result become biased about the shape of the income distribution. Their biased beliefs in turn affect who they choose to interact with, and hence there is a two-way interaction between segregation and misperceptions about society. I show one possible application of this novel framework to the question of income inequality and the demand for redistribution. I demonstrate that under segregation an increase in income inequality can lead to a decline in perceived inequality and therefore to a fall in people's support for redistribution. I motivate my main assumptions with empirical evidence from a small survey that I conducted via Amazon Mechanical Turk.

"Sorting in the Presence of Misperceptions"

Abstract: In this paper I develop a general model of how social segregation and beliefs interact. Sorting decisions will be affected by beliefs about society, but these beliefs about society are in turn influenced by social interactions. In my model, people sort into social groups according to income, but become biased about the income distribution once they interact only with their own social circle. I define "biased sorting equilibria", which are stable partitions in which people want to stay in their chosen group, despite their acquired misperceptions about the other groups. I introduce a refinement criterion -- the consistency requirement -- and find necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of biased sorting equilibria.

"Monopolistic Supply of Sorting, Inequality and Welfare"

Abstract: In this paper I present a model in which a monopolist offers citizens the opportunity to segregate into groups according to income. I focus initially on the case of two groups and show that a monopolist with fixed costs of offering the sorting technology will see profits increase as income inequality increases. I then analyze how the monopolist's optimal group partition varies with inequality and show that for a broad field of income distributions, monopolist profits increase with inequality, while at the same time total welfare of sorting given the monopolist's optimal schedule decreases. In the last section I examine how these findings generalize if the monopolist doesn't face costs of offering the sorting technology and can therefore offer as many groups as she wants.

"Social Learning with Congestion Costs"

Abstract: This paper examines equilibria in models with private information and congestion costs. Players have to choose between two alternatives. Depending on the state of the world, one of the two alternatives yields a higher stand-alone utility. The players do not know the state of the world, but each player receives a private signal about it. Irrespective of the state, the payoff from choosing an alternative is decreasing in the overall number of players who choose the respective alternative. The paper examines equilibrium choice behaviour in two setups. In the first setup players choose simultaneously. In the second setup they choose sequentially and can observe previous players' choices. The last section of the paper discusses social efficiency in the presence of congestion costs.
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