Marco Serena, Ph.D.Wissenschaftlicher Referent

Telefon:+49-89-24246-5259
Fax:+49-89-24246-5299
E-Mail: marco.serena@tax.mpg.de

Raum:M8.606

Persönliche Webseite (mit aktualisierten Papers):

https://sites.google.com/site/marcoserenaphd/

 

Arbeitsbereiche:

Mikroökonomie, Wettbewerb, politische Ökonomie, Informationen

 

Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang:

2016 – heute: Wissenschaftlicher Referent am Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen

2012 – 2017: Promotionsstudium in Economics (summa cum laude), Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien

2010 – 2012: M.A. in Economics, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, Spanien

2007 – 2009: M.A. in Economics (summa cum laude), Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien

2004 – 2007: B.A. in Economics, Bocconi University, Mailand, Italien

Internationale Zeitschriften mit Gutachterverfahren:

Barbieri, S. und Serena, M.Winner’s effort maximization in large contests. Journal of Mathematical Economics, im Erscheinen. 

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102512

Mavridis, C. und Serena, M., 2021. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits. European Journal of Political Economy, 67(4)

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101961

Serena, M., 2021. The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management. International Journal of Game Theory, S. 1-21

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00750-0

Serena, M., 2019. A game-free microfoundation of mutual optimism. Games, 10(4), S. 37-50

DOI: 10.3390/g10040037

Mavridis, C. und Serena, M., 2018. Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size. Public Choice, S. 53-66

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6

Serena, M., 2017. Sequential contests revisited. Public Choice, 173(1-2), S. 131-144

DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0467-3

Serena, M., 2017. Quality contests. European Journal of Political Economy, 46, S. 15-25

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.008

Diskussionspapiere:

Send, J. und Serena, M., An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance. 

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Chen, B. und Serena, M., Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020 - 08. 

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Barbieri, S. und Serena, M., Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-07. 

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Barbieri, S. und Serena, M., Winners' efforts in team contests. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper No. 2019-03. 

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Serena, M., A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-12. 

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Serena, M., Biasing Dynamic Contests Between Ex-Ante Symmetric Players. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-06. 

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Serena, M. und Arve, M., Level-k models rationalize overspending in contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-09. 

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Serena, M. und Corchón, L., Properties of contests. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-10. 

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Serena, M., Harnessing Beliefs to Optimally Disclose Contestants' Types. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-11. 

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Wissenschaftliche Aufsätze in Sammelbänden:

Serena, M. und Corchón, L., 2018. Contests Theory: a survey. In: Corchón, L. und Marini, M. A. (Hrsg.)Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial OrganizationCheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar.