Referent: Sebastián Cortés-Corrales
Date & Time: Cincinnati (12 pm), Los Angeles (9 am), Bath (5 pm), Munich (6 pm), Singapore (September 09, 12 am), Beijing (September 09, 12 am) and Sydney (September 09, 2 am)
Sebastián Cortés-Corrales will present his paper titled "How does the network structure affect connection-specific choices? An experiment on the competitive allocation of resources in weighted networks" (joint work with David Rojo Arjona).
Abstract of the paper:
In a wide range of economic, social, and political networks, agents allocate a finite resource (e.g., time) across their differently valued connections with other agents. A growing theoretical literature investigates how these pre-existing weighted networks affect optimal choices. This paper offers, instead, an empirical analysis identifying the effect of elements of the network on actual choices. For that, we design a novel experiment, and analyze the resulting compositional data. Over-allocation to the most valued conflict depends positively (and significantly) on the rival’s degree and, to a larger extent, eigenvector centrality, whereas the effect of the conflict value is limited.
Chair: Dan Kovenock, Co-Chair: Iryna Topolyan
Event Team
Max-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen
Marstallplatz 1
80539 München
Telefon: +49-89-24246-5255
Fax: +49-89-24246-5299
Eine kleine Auswahl unserer Forschung und besonderer Ereignisse aus 2024.