Contests & Conflict | 13.12.2023 | 16:00
Crowdsourcing Contests: a choice among multiple contests

Referent: Ella Segev

Date & Time: December 13, 2023 - Los Angeles (7 am), Cincinnati (10 am), Bath (3 pm), Munich (4 pm), Beijing (11 pm), Singapore (11 pm), Sydney (December 14, 2 am)

Ella Segev will present the paper titled "Crowdsourcing Contests: a choice among multiple contests".

This talk is part of the Global Seminar on Contests & Conflict, an online seminar series with researchers from across the world. You can sign up to the Global Network to get information and invitations (including the Zoom Link for each event) about the Global Seminar hereMax-Planck-Institut für Steuerrecht und Öffentliche Finanzen: Global Seminar on Contests & Conflict (

You can directly access the event here:


(Meeting ID: 945 7563 6701, Passcode: 664926)

Abstract of the Paper:

In a crowdsourcing contest an organizer posts a task (e.g., logo design or code development) on a dedicated platform and offers a prize for the winner (or possibly winners). Solvers then submit solutions to the task and the organizer rewards the solver with the highest quality submission. For the contest organizers, having more contestants is critical to ensuring they receive qualitatively acceptable solutions. Thus, crowdsourcing contest platforms can be characterized as an environment of competition among multiple contests, where every contest organizer competes over the attention of potential solvers. We address the inconsistencies in the extant literature about the behavioral effects on both participation and effort of increasing the prize awarded by contest organizers. We analyze user behavior in a highly controlled experimental setting in which users can participate (by exerting real effort) in multiple online contests that vary only in their prizes. The analysis of the behavior of the participants in our experiments shows that both participation and effort were non-monotonic with the prize, that the low-prize contest was the most effective for the organizers, and that increasing the prize may actually decrease the benefits for organizers. 

Chair: Daniel Kovenock, Co-Chair: Iryna Topolyan


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